The Future of Nursing in an Evolving Health Care System Research Paper - 1

The Future of Nursing in an Evolving Health Care System - Research Paper Example Nurses were required to be enjoined in talks regarding transformation of healthcare service delivery by giving them a greater voice and control in making reliable and effective decisions (RWJF, 2012a). The transformation was aimed at reforming the healthcare delivery approach and ensuring patients received better and reliable care at much lower costs that they could afford. To make service delivery more affordable and efficient, nurses had to be made the center of the discussions as they are much closer to patients in healthcare facilities. Such were the proposed strategic decisions to transform the Future of Nursing in advancing healthcare delivery. The IOM report on the future of Nursing was of much importance in the nursing profession. Nurses have varying levels of education and competencies raging from the licensed practicing nurses who in most cases are in contact with patients in nursing homes, to nurse scientists who are actively involved in research work on how to improve the care of patients and improving the nursing profession. The IOM report considered all classes of nurses across education levels, roles, and settings in envisioning the future of the profession (Institute of Medicine, 2010). Such an approach implied all nurses regardless of their duties and settings were empowered through the committee recommendations. In addition, the report suggested that all nurses had to be given room to practice to the full extent of training or education. This is important because; nurse licensing and practice are widely varied across states, with the regulations related to the scope of practice defining what activities a qualif ied nurse has to perform, all which affect different nurses in different ways (Institute of Medicine, 2010). Moreover, the recommendations of the IOM committee sought to improve the nursing profession by recommending that nurses had to achieve higher levels of education and training by going through a much improved education system

6 Discussion Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

6 Discussion - Essay Example This goes hand-in-hand with egoism, as the person is only doing something to fully benefit themselves without taking others into concern. Some of the objections to psychological egoism include the fact that some people do act in genuine altruistic ways; there are some cases where people do not have the time to decide who is going to benefit from their actions, they just care about following through with those actions; egoism and altruism are capable of connecting with each other, making in nearly impossible to decide if something was done egoistically or altruistically. Not everyone does something solely to benefit themselves; many of them do act on the best interests of others. Psychological egoism states that people act on for themselves. The majority of people are not that selfish and self-centered, many of them will act in ways that positively affect others without thinking of themselves once. The concept of psychological egoism points to humanity being callous and insensitive to the needs of others, that they could never act to benefit someone other than themselves. This assumption is incorrect - there are numerous people willing to do something for others without being benefited themselves. There are many situations that a person can find themselves in that do not allow them time to think about who they are doing something for, least of all themselves. Some people act on impulse, doing what feels right at the time, or doing what needs to be done, only thinking about the benefits and consequences after the matter. This goes against the fact that psychological egoism attempts to prove that people only think of themselves when acting in any such way. However, there are people who simply find that they do not have the time to fully consider the situation - their main concern is seeing the act through to the end. This often happens during emergencies, such as if a person were to run into oncoming traffic to rescue a

Candide by Voltaire Analysis

Candide by Voltaire Analysis According, to Candide by Voltaire, he describes the transformation of the protagonist Candide, throughout the story. Voltaire utilized satire, characterization, and techniques of exaggeration and contrast to represent Candides point of view in life. Basically the protagonist endures the human suffering to get his final destiny. Moreover Voltaire demonstrates the character development over the course starting with an innocent personality as a child who does not have responsibility to know into a great man. In the text the language shows Candides progress towards maturity. In the beginning of the novel the reader finds compact, colorful and crisp sentences as Candide, the hero rushes through life. Later Voltaire adopts a calm and reflective style analogous to Candides mental development. Also, the author disproves the overly optimistic philosophy that Candide and Pangloss represent. While the experiences of Candide and Pangloss conflict dramatically with this philosophy, both choose to maintain their beliefs in this regard. Candide to get his change goes through many adventures and gradually matures into an experienced and practical man. Some of his adventures were sad and some not. He was expulsed from the palace for his love to Cunegonde, but it help him to faces the cruelty of life with the philosophical view that all things in life are necessary for some greater good. Candide is a simple person who has not had much real life experience. He is banished from his home and unexpectedly introduced to the reality of the outside world. Throughout his travels he develops a new philosophy of life. His eyes open to reality, He sees that everything does not happen for the best as the philosophers and metaphysician Pangloss had told him in the Barons castle. In Europe as well as in America, he encounters misery. He meets a number of people from various walks of life. He comes across many philosophers ranging from extreme optimism of Pangloss to the pessimism of Martin. He experiences the love with Ms Cunegonde but it was not accept for their different social classes. One of some changes of Candide was his philosophy really optimistic mind everything is for the best.It was a phrase of his teacher Pangloss He taught that everything was for the best and Candide, having never heard any other philosophies, agrees blindly. While at sea, Candide sees a man who saved his life by nursing him back to health thrown overboard. Candide is ready to jump into the raging waters after his benefactor, but Pangloss stops him. He demonstrates that the Bay of Lisbon had been made for the Anabaptist to be drowned,(p.386) . This begins to clash with Candides ideologies: if this is the best of all worlds, how was this man who was so kind and generous thrown to his death and Candide not to save him? Candide begins to doubt in this philosophy. Candide eventually learns how to achieve happiness in the face of misadventure. He learns that in order to attain a state of contentment, one must be part of society where there is collective effort and work. Candide spends a great deal of time traveling the world and learning of many different idealogies in metaphysics. Finally, he decides to settle down and live by farming his own garden-this symbolizes his surrender to simple self-preservation. After a long and difficult struggle in which Candide is forced to overcome misfortune to find happiness, he concludes that everything is not as good as it seems the way Dr. Pangloss, his tutor had taught him. During his adventures he realize that things not always happen for the best, he understand that it just happen in his innocent mind. However, Candide always keep in his heart goodness amd love. Also, he knows that at the end, he is going to find the best for his life.We are destined , in the end , for another universe, no doubt that is the one where everything is well.(p.391).Also, Candide begins to experience human suffering in many different ways as love, loneliness and disasters. He understands that no matter who are you, always going to experiment the both sides happiness and sadness because is part of human life, Its true, and you see how people make mistakes who have not received a measure of education(p.402).Make mistakes is of humans and those mistakes make the experience, that later help us to take decisions. Furthermore, others important characters that contribute for Candides change are The Old Woman and Martin. Both of them help Candide to get more knowledge in outside world and contrast the Pangloss philosophy. The old woman, she was a suffered woman that had to survive of many obstacles. My last post was as servant to the Jew don Issachar; he attached me to your service, my lovely one; and I attached myself to your destiny, till I have become more concerned with your fate than with my own.(p.396).In the other hand Martin is a very pessimist man who had been experienced bad situations; he was really offended with life. It was another event that makes Candide changes his philosophy. In his amazing journey he finds that every event in the world has a reason, and whether there are positive or negative moments you have to live them. There is no effect without a cause, all events are linked by the chain of necessity and arranged for the best. I had to be driven away from Miss Cunegonde, I had to run the gauntlet, I have to beg my bread until I can earn it; none of this could have happened otherwise(P.381). However, by the end of the story the protagonist realized that to achieve happiness a lot of work, compromises, and sacrifices are necessary. Though life does not become any easier, at this point Candide begins to grow from a naive young person into a grown realist. Candide realizes he must take responsibility for his life. He must accept situations and try to change obstacles that may be hindrances. Candide learns that labor will eliminate the three curses of mankind: want, boredom, and vice. Candide realizes he must build his own life, however simple it may be. Voltaire says through Candides ultimate discovery that happiness in many ways depends on a persons attitude. When meeting a man that is happy with a simple garden to tend and a family to love, Candide realizes life does not have to be full of wealth in order to be happy. At the end he realizes that everything in life is not evil, especially when a person strives to make changes and not simply accept what comes their way. Voltaires philosophy expressed through Candides final realization is that We must cultivate our garden,(p.4380, which is the key to happiness. By cultivating our garden, Voltaire means that we must make the best of our situation in the present moment. We accept what we are given in life and work to make the best of it. It all has to do with our perspective on life. Candide finally realizes that he must try to make his own happiness even while battling hardships. Candides happiness is finally realized when he too becomes a man of simple means with a garden to tend and a loved one at his side.

Communication In The Millenium :: essays research papers

Communication In the Millenium: 2000 and Beyond The Year 2000. The Millenium. With these phrases come the thoughts of the future and futuristic living. Although the lifestyle of the Jetson’s, with moon shot apartment complexes and flying cars, is more science fiction and entertainment than science fact, how many of their fantasy inventions might someday be a fact? With the new century less than 3 months away, the year 2000 quickly brings to mind the inventions we once thought of as children watching movies about the future. Flying cars, colonies on the moon, and meals in a pill once floating through our minds. Although it may seem that many of these things are still decades away, and maybe for the better, we should look at how far things have already come, especially in the way that we talk and communicate with each other. How many times have we heard about â€Å"the good old days† when things were â€Å"so much simpler?† When the only communication possible was telegrams, telephone calls, and writing letters. All of those mentioned ways of communication hasn’t become totally obsolete yet, but with all the current technologies, such as the Internet, email, and video-conferencing, it would make most people back in the â€Å"good old days† stare wide-eyed and shake their heads in disbelief. How would one even begin to explain modems and servers and chat rooms to someone who had just bought a touch-tone phone? Yet, it was back in those â€Å"good old days† when things that we today consider necessities would have then been considered impossible. So, what about communication technologies of tomorrow? Will they have us shaking our head and staring wide-eyed as our parents and grandparents did so many years ago at the mere hint of an idea of communication beyond the telephone? Can we even begin to comprehend the way communication will change the world; the way it is changing the world as we speak? Or will we just accept it as we go, marveling at the new innovations and technologies briefly, as if something new isn’t new enough for us. One thing when mentioning communication in the millenium is how exactly will things change? Will all of us need to be Internet-literate? According to Paul Taylor, the next millenium will be defined by having access to computational resources for the communication purposes. We as a society are already so dependent on these resources that they are becoming more and more mainstream everyday.

Atomic Threat: New Weapon of the 1940s

What follows will be a brief summary and review of three books concerning the advent of the atomic bomb, its use on Japan, the politics and diplomacy involved   and the effects that Truman and his cabinet suspected that the bomb would have on future wars and future politics.   Three authors, Gar Alperoitz, Herbert Feis and J. Samuel Walker present similar information about the development and use of the atomic bomb and the concerns that those few politicians with intimate knowledge of the bomb suspected its existence would have on future global politics. The authors speak from different perspectives and yet at points provide strikingly similar details about the events surrounding the development of the bomb.   While all three authors focus on the development and use of the bomb, each approaches the subject from a slightly different perspective.   Alperovitz focuses on diplomacy with Stalin, Walker focuses on the situation in Japan and Feis pays more attention to those involved with the development of the bomb, both politicians and scientists.   We will begin our considerations of these different approaches with Alperovitz's focus on the effects the bomb had on diplomacy and move on from there. Alperovitz book consists of a long 60 page introduction, eight chapters and four appendices describing the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union prior to and after the advent of the bomb.   He begins with Truman's concerns about the Russians when he took over from FDR. As he prepared for his first meeting with a USSR representative Truman declared that â€Å"if the Russians did not care to cooperate, ‘they could go to hell.'† A few hours later, the President expressed the same view to Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov in rather undiplomatic terms. Truman desired to continue FDR's policy of cooperation with the Russians, but his attitude when he spoke the above words were not the result of a moment's flash of temper. Problems were developing over the USSR's dealings with Poland.   Alperovitz's primary argument that the bomb had a very significant influence on American views of diplomacy with the USSR long before the bomb. The bomb was inextricably bound with Truman's strategy at Potsdam in July 1945 and â€Å"was regarded as a ‘master card' of diplomacy.† (Alperovitz, p. 1)   Alperovitz states that â€Å"†¦a major reason the bomb was used was ‘to make Russia more manageable†¦.† (Alperovitz, p. 1).   Touched upon the impact of nuclear weapons on the beginning of the Cold War. â€Å"In August 1945, Eisenhower felt that ‘before the atom bomb was used, I would have said yes, I was sure we could keep peace with Russia. Now, I don't know†¦People are frightened and disturbed all over. Everyone feels insecure again.† (Alperovitz, p. 2)   Truman and some members of his cabinet believed that Russia was attempting to dominate Eastern Europe so concerns over Poland had been chosen as a symbolic issue to force a showdown with Stalin because of Truman's concern that Stalin was had plans for all of Eastern and Central Europe.   (Alperovitz, p. 70)  Ã‚   Secretary Forrestal stated, â€Å"This difficulty over Poland could not be treated as an isolated incident.† (Alperovitz, p. 70) â€Å"Forrestal argued: ‘We had better have a showdown with them now rather than later.'† (Alperovitz, p. 70) On the surface, this showdown strategy seemed to have been a complete reversal of FDR's policy only a few weeks earlier. There were three major obstacles to Truman's firm, showdown approach. First, FDR appeared to have had a strong belief that cooperation with Russia was possible. Second was the concern that American-Soviet cooperation might be destroyed and that a separate peace accord between Germany and the USSR might be signed, a concern that was eliminated when the German government collapsed. The third concern was that a showdown with Russia might result in the loss of Soviet help in the war against Japan. While Truman's approach was one of an immediate showdown with Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill took a different approach. â€Å"He believed it might be possible to obtain additional concessions from the Russians if he could maintain the extended troop positions†¦Ã¢â‚¬  rather than withdrawing Anglo-American troops as General Eisenhower had proposed. (Alperovitz, p. 90) Churchill was prepared to use any argument at his disposal to persuade Truman to his point. Churchill cabled Truman, â€Å"‘The Russian occupational zone has the smallest proportion of people and grows by far the largest proportion of food†¦Before we move from the tactical positions we have at present achieved,' the Russians should be forced to agree that ‘the feeding of the German population must be treated as a whole and that the available supplies must be divided pro rata between the occupational zones.'† (Alperovitz, p. 91) When Truman took up the issue with his Joint Chiefs of Staff for advice, they were unwilling to use troop positions for political purposes. Even though Truman recognized that the Russians were in a strong position, he followed the showdown on Poland with a firm approach to the problem of cooperation in Central Europe. (Alperovitz, p. 93) Truman's joint action with Churchill stressed his willingness to present a united Anglo-American stand against Russia. Like General Eisenhower, various military authorities believed that this approach to the troop issue would yield negative results. By mid-May 1945, Truman's plan for cooperative control of Central Europe was faced with a direct challenge. On April 24 1945, one day after President Truman had a showdown with Molotov, Secretary of War Stimson wrote President Truman stating, â€Å"(The atomic bomb) has such a bearing on our present foreign relations and such an important effect upon all my thinking in this field that I think you should know about it without further delay.† (Alperovitz, pp. 103-04) Up to this point, President was apparently unaware of the bomb. Stimson had casually mentioned to Truman about an â€Å"immense project†¦(that) was under way–a project looking to the development of a new explosive of almost unbelievable destructive power,† Stimson had felt no compelling reason or need to fully discuss the matter with President Truman up to that time until after the showdown with Molotov. (Alperovitz, p. 104) Secretary Stimson discussed the atomic bomb with the President for three quarters of an hour and it was â€Å"assumed–not decided–that the bomb would be used.† Truman was made aware that Japan had been the target of the weapon development program and that a special Air Force group was about to leave for its overseas base. Although Stimson expressed confidence that the bomb would shorten the war, the use of the bomb against Japan was not main subject of discussion. The diplomatic implications of the atomic bomb dominated private discussion between Stimson and Truman during the last week of April and the first week of May, 1945. President Truman eventually came to agree that the atomic bomb would have decisive implications for diplomacy with Russia. By shortly after April 25, 1945, British representatives knew that a committee would be set up â€Å"to consider the whole ranged of political issues which will arise in connection with the atomic bomb.† (Alperovitz, p. 110) News of the atomic bomb first came to the average American and to most senior government officials from the newspapers. The weapon's power was disclosed in a way that produced great emotion and optimism about its usefulness as an instrument of high policy. (Alperovitz, p. 237) On August 16, 1945, after the bomb was used and the war ended, Truman told the press, that â€Å"Japan would not be divided into occupation zones, and declared †¦that as far as Japan was concerned, ‘in the event of any difference of opinion (among the Allied powers) the policies of the United States will govern.† (Alperovitz, p. 240) The atomic bomb had strengthened the American hand in diplomacy. In the â€Å"whirlwind days† â€Å"immediately after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American diplomacy changed†¦swiftly.† Secretary Byrnes underscored the breadth and scope of the departures from typical diplomacy by saying, â€Å"Those†¦days†¦were full of action.† The sheer volume of work caused the Secretary of State to ask that the London foreign ministers' meeting set for September 1 be postponed until September 10.† (Alperovitz, p. 243). Truman declared: â€Å"The atomic bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world†¦We must constitute ourselves trustees of this new force†¦The best interests of the United States require the utmost cooperation by all concerned in keeping secret now and for all time in the future all scientific and technical information†¦.† (Alperovitz, p. 243) One week later, Truman directed that no information on the nuclear development project be released without the specific approval of the President. (Alperovitz, p. 243) Alperovitz clearly points out that the atomic bomb and the temporary American monopoly in possessing the bomb was viewed as a â€Å"great advantage to American diplomacy. In (Secretary Byrnes') view, the ‘primary task was to establish a â€Å"lasting structure of peace†Ã¢â‚¬ ¦A stable Europe, essential to world peace and American security alike, was the number-one goal. Byrnes believed that the nuclear monopoly could be maintained for at least seven years†¦within that period, with the support of the revolutionary weapon, his diplomacy could easily achieve its idealistic objectives. Thus, the weapon seemed a crucial factor in forcing agreement to an American plan for permanent peace–a plan which, ipso facto, would prevent another world war.† (Alperovitz, p. 245) Alperovitz goes on to add that Byrnes vision â€Å"obviated the danger of an arms race.† (Alperovitz, p. 245) History has shown that Byrnes was clearly wrong. Not only did the atomic bomb fail to eliminate the arms race, but it seems to have added to the race tremendously, but with all that was at stake, the bomb made going to war a much more risky proposition than it had been in the past. J. Samuel Walker's book â€Å"Prompt and Utter Destruction† focused on another aspect of the new weapon. Walker notes in his preface that, â€Å"The question of why President Truman used atomic bombs against Japan has intrigued me since I was an undergraduate history major. Indeed, it was the first issue in which the competing arguments of different scholars caught my interest†¦.† (Walker, p. ix) This statement in his preface sets up the direction for his book. Walker states, â€Å"In fact†¦Truman never faced a categorical choice between the bomb and an invasion that would cost hundreds of thousands of American lives†¦the prevailing perception (about the president's alternatives) vastly oversimplifies the situation in the summer of 1945†¦.† (Walker, p. 5) Walker points out 1) that there were other available options for a â€Å"reasonably short time† end to the war without resorting to the bomb, 2) Truman and his key advisers believed that Japan was so weak that the war could end even before an invasion began and 3) American military planners believed that even in a worst case scenario, American casualties would be far fewer than the hundreds of thousands Truman and his advisers claimed after the war. So, â€Å"Was the use of the bomb necessary at all† and if so, 2) â€Å"What exactly did it accomplish?† Walker begins by taking a look at the President. Truman won greater affection and esteem from the American people after his presidency and after he died than he had while president. He was honest, often indiscreet and blunt and needlessly offensive and â€Å"his decisiveness could lead to superficial or impulsive judgments.† (p. 7) The world was embroiled in a global war that made his arrival into the Oval Office a period of extraordinarily difficult problems and, even though he had been vice president, he came to the White House without adequate preparation. Indeed, he began his turn at the helm basically â€Å"in the dark about many of his predecessor's policies and commitments†¦.† (Walker, p. 9) The one fundamental military strategy from Roosevelt that seemed clear to Truman was his predecessor's desire â€Å"to achieve complete victory at the lowest cost in American lives.† (Walker, p. 9) After October 1941, President Roosevelt authorized a major effort to explore the feasibility of an atomic bomb. The Manhattan project began with the purpose of addressing the â€Å"bewildering variety† of scientific and engineering uncertainties connected with nuclear energy and the bomb. Once scientists had proven that a nuclear chain reaction was possible, the Manhattan Project focused on designing a bomb and producing the fuel to make it work. All of this was kept secret from Vice President Truman, so when he suddenly became President, he knew virtually nothing about the Manhattan Project or the bomb even though he had learned of â€Å"a massive and highly secret effort to build a new weapon† while he was chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program in the Senate. However, while serving as a senator he did not receive any details. Secretary Stimson confirmed and elaborated information about the bomb to the President in a meeting on April 25, 1945, but Secretary Stimson warned, â€Å"the existence of such a weapon would create profound problems because the United States would not be able to maintain a monopoly on the technology. Further, the issue of sharing information about the atomic bomb would become ‘a primary question of our foreign relations.† (Walker, p. 13) When Truman took office, he was outraged by the Soviet conduct in Poland, but he did not want to ruin the relatively good relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945, less than a month after Truman became president, but the war in Japan raged on. Americans were still upset about the attack on Pearl Harbor and had also become outraged when the U.S. government learned about how the Japanese mistreated American prisoners and released that information to the public and the Japanese were equally as disdainful of Americans thanks to the â€Å"warped stereotypes† Japanese leaders painted of Americans during the war. So, the Americans fought a â€Å"war without mercy in Japan. (Walker, p. 23) Even though the Japanese people were losing confidence in their leaders and public morale was deteriorating, the fact that Japan was on the verge of defeat did not mean that the country was on the verge of surrender. By the end of June 1945, both American and Japanese leaders, including Japan's emperor, as well as the Japanese people realized that the war would end in Japan's defeat.   On June 17, 1945, President Truman wrote in his diary that deciding between invading Japan and relying solely on bombing and blockade to end the war was his â€Å"hardest decision to date.† ( Walker, p. 35) Advisers in the Truman administration realized that â€Å"‘there was a large submerged class in Japan' that did not favor the war but would ‘fight tenaciously' for their homeland.† In a meeting on June 18, 1945, Secretary Stimson hinted that he â€Å"thought the war might end by some other means, though at this time he did not specify what the alternatives were.† (Walker, p. 37) Meanwhile, although there were some proponents who were in favor of moderating the stance for Japan's unconditional surrender, the prevailing attitude in the United States as a whole was for the unconditional surrender of Japan. By July 13, 1945, it was clear that America's demand for an unconditional surrender was the main obstacle to a settlement. So, despite the mutual desires of the American people and the Japanese people for peace and the leaders of both countries faced the same obstacle–unconditional surrender. President Truman faced choices as to how to overcome this dilemma. There were three choices, including invasions with the potentially high costs. A fourth alternative also existed, the atomic bomb. Truman and his advisers proceeded with their planning as if the bomb didn't exist because the bomb had not been tested successfully, but those in the administration who knew about the bomb hoped that a successful test would lead to their goal of ending the war at a lower cost than the alternatives. Final preparations for the atomic test, named â€Å"Trinity† proceeded amid strain, excitement, uncertainty and ominous weather forecasts, but at 8:00 AM on July 16, 1945, Secretary Stimson receive news of the successful test of the bomb. President Truman was delighted when he heard the news. Secretary Byrnes was committed to the belief that the bomb would be an instrument to advance American diplomacy, particularly in light of growing differences with the Soviet Union. On the diplomatic front, Truman took his cue from Secretary Byrnes and agreed that the bomb would serve as a valuable tool for diplomacy. Ultimately, it appears that Truman used the bomb â€Å"because he had no compelling reason to avoid using it.† (Walker, p. 95) American leaders had assumed that the bomb would be used when available and there were no military, diplomatic, political, or moral considerations contrary to that assumption. Diplomatically, it placed America in a stronger position with the Soviets and it was politically popular as a means in ending the war quickly as opposed to the dire prospects of victory without the bomb. Herbert Feis opens his work by considering how the war could be ended. In May 1945 the war in Europe was over and Japan fought alone. Japanese life and production was being â€Å"smashed and burned†. The question was, â€Å"How could (the war) be ended surely and quickly?† (Feis, p. 3) â€Å"The obvious and perhaps most certain was was to beat down the Japanese until they could no longer fight on–by enlarging the assaults on Japan and Japanese armed forces wherever they could be reached†¦Ã¢â‚¬  (Feis, p. 3) Another means was by inducement and a third, the most secret, was by shock. Each of these approaches could end the war or two or three of them could do so in combination. The end of the European war made American, British and Russian troops available for use in the Pacific. As for the war in the General Marshall felt â€Å"that the hope that air power alone would be able to drive Japan out of the war was unjustified; and that the task would be the more difficult there since the Japanese were scattered through mountainous country.† (Feis, p. 9) The U.S. had planned an invasion of Kyushu, but there were concerns that America could not go further and force its way upon Tokyo. (Feis, p. 11) The Joint Chiefs adopted strategic plans for the war in the Pacific on May 25, 1945. Those plans were approved by President Truman on June 18th, but those plans included the desire to have Russian forces enter the final assault with U.S. forces. General MacArthur emphatically stated to a visitor from the War Department that â€Å"no attempt ought to be made to invade Japan proper unless and until the Russian army had been previously committed to action in Manchuria; that he though this was essential, and should be brought about without†¦delay†¦.† President Truman's tone was stern. He felt that Japanese aggression against China, the Japanese assault upon America and the Japanese cruelties during the was warranted severity and he reaffirmed his intention to carry on the war â€Å"until the Japanese military and naval forces lay down their arms in unconditional surrender.† (Feis, p. 16) On the morning of May 28, 1945, President Truman was urged to try to induce the Japanese to surrender by dispelling the worst fears of the consequences. Secretary Stimson and General Marshall concluded that â€Å"the question of what to say to the Japanese and when to say it, should be governed by whether and when the United States had the atomic bomb.† (Feis, p. 19) Others in the cabinet did not believe that Japan would heed any warnings of surrender until the Japanese were more thoroughly beaten down. (Feis, p. 19) Although the prime incentive for making the bomb was the effort to defeat Germany (Feis, p. 28), the dimensions of creating the bomb became apparent and its creators were compelled to face the fact that the war against Germany might be over before the bomb was ready for use. The number of issues surrounding the creation of the bomb included what type of bomb to make. During the creation of the bomb, those in the Roosevelt administration who knew about it believed that knowledge needed to make the new weapon could be confined long enough as to allow the United States and Britain to secure an advantage that would keep the Soviet Union from being too pushy.   When Roosevelt died, Secretary Stimson lingered after the first Cabinet meeting to tell the new President briefly about the immense undertaking regarding the bomb of which the former vice president now president had no knowledge. As Truman learned more about the weapon with time, Truman began to recognize the enormous significance of the new weapon. The President accepted Secretary Stimson's belief that â€Å"†¦our leadership in the war and the development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization which it would further.† (Feis, p. 38) When plans to use the bomb were considered, one consideration was to demonstrate the bomb's power before using it, but there were concerns against its use. The possibility that a country could assure its security by increasing its nuclear armaments (as was later the practice) was viewed to be invalid. It was felt that â€Å"the safety of all nations henceforth could be achieved only if they agreed to subject their activities in atomic energy to international control. However, the chance of bringing about such an agreement would be greatly lessened by the sudden and unannounced use of the weapon against Japan. Both the diplomatic and military value of the bomb spanned a wide range of concerns. Using the bomb against Japan faced a range of concerns as evidenced by the following statement: â€Å"†¦they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of military application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration of atomic weapons, and have feared that if they would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use†¦.† (Feis, p. 54) Before using the new weapon, Americans were determined to continue their assault on Japan and officials in Washington were striving to compose a statement which would tell the Japanese how we intended to treat them once they surrendered.(Feis, p. 63) Feis considers issues not discussed by the other authors. He wonders, â€Å"Whether, if the United States had pledged itself as soon as the war was over to destroy the other bombs it had and dismantle the factories in which they were made other countries would have been willing to join with it in a trustworthy system of control of atomic energy, must remain forever a provocation to the speculative historian.: (Feis, p. 190) I could be biased by this, but I certainly enjoyed each of these books, however I must admit to a great interest in many aspects of World War II, including matters surrounding the atomic bomb.   These books covered an aspect of the war that took concerns of future wars to a new and frightening level and often placed the reader right in the thick of issues and diplomacy connected with the atomic bomb and other issues of the war.   All three books discuss the global atmosphere at the time of a world in turmoil at the end of World War II and the bomb's contribution that bringing that turmoil to an end, but at the same time, each of the books focus on aspects of the politics surrounding the bomb. All reveal the mutual suspicion and mistrust between Russia and her two strongest allies in the War, the U.S. and Britain.   They reveal how this mistrust played a role in the development, use and politics surrounding the bomb.   Each book portrays different details surrounding the development and use of the bomb.   Although or perhaps despite their different perspectives, all three books are interesting and had some surprizingly similar aspects.   Each author tells his story from a different perspective, each author outlines some aspects of their story with common events and from common perspectives. Alperovitz seems to focus a lot on Truman's concern regarding Stalin's desires for Poland and other areas of Eastern Europe.   Walker focused a great deal on events in the Pacific and Feis tended to concentrate much more of his focus on the development of the bomb.   Combined, these three books present an interesting and a more comprehensive look at how the bomb developed, its initial influence on diplomacy and how politicians felt that the existence of the bomb would impact future events in Europe. Each author tells an interesting and provacotive story with behind the scenes details from a different perspective and each author lays out interesting and compelling facts surrounding the concerns, suspicions and global politics between Russia and ther wartime allies, the United States and Great Britain.   I found each of them to be interesting and compelling reading. References Alperoitz, Gar (1965).   Atomic diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam; the use of the atomic bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet power .   New York, NY:   Simon and Schuster. Feis, Herbert (1966).   The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II.   Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. Walker,   J. Samuel   (1997).   Prompt and utter destruction : Truman and the use of atomic bombs against Japan.   Chapel Hill, NC:   University of North Carolina Press.         

Polaroid Case Study

BACKDROP Polaroid is manufacturer of photographic equipment, accessories and related items used in instant photography. The organization was divided into two main divisions – The Consumer Photography Division and the Technical and Industrial Division with each of these divisions contributing around 40% of Polaroid’s revenues of $ 1. 3 billion in 1984. The company produced two main types of films: 1. The peel apart film which required the user to physically pull the film out of the camera and, 2. The integral film, which came out of the camera automatically. The integral films were manufactured in the R2 building at the Waltham Massachusetts site. The operations at R2 included production of sheet metal springs, pods, plastic cartridges and plastic end caps and then assembled these into film cartridges. R2 ran three shifts, five days a week, employing approximately 900 workers out of which 700 were part time. QUALITY AND PROCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES AT R2 All films were vetted by the Quality Control Department before being released into the market. The QC procedure included sampling of 15 finished cartridges (each containing 10 frames) out of every lot of 5000 cartridges. If the sampled cartridges contained defects in excess of allowable limits, the lot was held and further testing was done. Additional testing usually led to reworking, or rejection of a portion or all of the lot. Subsequent lots were the subjected to even more rigorous testing by increasing the sample size tested. Quality checks were not the sole responsibility of the QC department. The operators usually sampled around 32 samples out of every lot. If the measurements went against the knowledge of the operator, the sample was rejected. After process control was initiated in R2 in the late 1970’s, process engineering technicians were made responsible for gathering data and making rough analyses. PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING QUALITY CONTROL Since the testing of cartridges was destructive, it resulted in sampled scrap. This, along with the product that failed acceptance sampling resulted in $3. 28 million in 1984. Another issue was that sampling did nothing to improve quality, it only improved the AOQ. In fact, due to the large production and low defect rates, if the production and quality control sampling were halved, the outgoing defectives would be 0. 3% of production. On the other hand, increasing the AOQ further would lead to prohibitively high costs due to increased sampling. The sampling process employed was also inaccurate. Time was spent on trying to reduce beta or consumer risk. Cartridges which were inspected and passed were sent back to production to be repackaged. But the handling of these cartridges its elf increased the chances of their developing defects which resulted in a vicious cycle of tests and retests and did not contribute to improving quality significantly while increasing costs considerably. To avoid losing production, operators often ‘salted’ boxes. Operators did not record frequently collected data and if they were in doubt, they would pass the component on to the QC Department believing that they would be able to detect the defect and reject the component if the defect was serious enough. â€Å"Tweaking† machines was an accepted practice in the plant. The objective of the exercise was to enable machines running and different speeds and variations to produce at their maximum capacity. The QC department did not focus on defects that were normally detected by consumers. For example, the most stringent auditors tested for excess reagent by flipping the film over right after exposing it, a defect that would not be noticed by a consumer. These stringent auditors averaged about 10% defectives. The conditions under which the tests were simulated were also out of sync with current market realities. External customers often used cameras which did not function precisely to specification, whereas the QC Department used ‘perfect’ cameras to test the film. This precluded the possibility of finding defects which would occur with imprecisely functioning cameras. GREENLIGHT The project objective was quality monitoring costs reduction while at the same time improving the quality of the product. The improvements in quality control processes were focused along with reducing the number of samples. The plan consisted of three distinct elements: 1. Statistical process control would be adapted as processes in control and capable of producing within specifications would produce more consistent quality. 2. Production operators would be given the process control tools that the process engineering technicians had been using and in conjunction with sampling would be expected to make disposition decisions themselves. 3. Quality control auditors would concentrate on training operators and operationalizing specifications on their new products. The statistical process control system involving both acceptance sampling and automated process control was to be implemented. SPC involved testing for productions within a pre-specified range. If the production went beyond the range, the production process had to be shut down maintenance was to be called to perform maintenance and recalibration. As a part of the process, the operators were to take six random measurements of a process characteristic during the course of their shift and then plot the mean measured value. This led to a drastic reduction in the number of samples tested and consequently the scrapping costs. The central problem in this project was the estimation of the central level and the control limits. Initially, the Quality Control auditors helped the operators in plotting the ranges and the operators’ protocol was to immediately shut down the machines and call for help whenever, the characteristic crossed the specified range. Moreover, eight consecutive mean values lying into the upper or lower zones near the control limits, or consistently upward trends were to be investigated by maintenance as well. The idea behind the project was to cut down the defect and testing losses. However, the idea backfired when the average defects detection by auditors shot up to 10% from 1% while at the operator level, it halved to about 0. 5%. Another problem was the lack of trust between the auditors and the operators. Standardized maintenance procedures also met with a lot of resistance as they were seen as making the whole maintenance process impersonalized and bureaucratic. The operators believed that they could obtain better results by ‘tweaking’ the machines. At the same time, operators refused to come out of the â€Å"maximize output† mindset and kept adjusting the machines for increased output. Also, the operators were sampling and testing more units than they were recording and adjusted the machines on the basis of the unrecorded defects. The nature of defects also changed. The variability in the kinds of defects detected increased, as the defects recorded by the auditors were markedly different from the defects recorded by the operators. ANALYSIS The purpose of inspection is to determine the level to which the product manufactured conforms to the specifications. Control charts and run tests are used for process control with the objective being to identify the causes of assignable variation, and to leave the system alone if the variation is random and the process is under control. The data given in exhibit 5 was used to calculate the means and ranges of the variables (pod weight and finger height) and the control limits for them were calculated. These have been plotted on control charts. Pod Weight  · Both the X bar and the R chart show that the process is in control, and that the process is capable. The variation present is random variation. Although the X bar chart shows that the process is in control, the last four readings may indicate a trend if further values move towards the lower control limit. Also, between the 16th and 28th readings, there are making of trends.  · The R chart shows that though the values of R lie within the control limits the range variation is high. Also, the behaviour of the readings is erratic which is a reas on for investigation. Finger Length  · The X bar graph shows that the process is out of control very often, signifying that an assignable cause of variation may be present. The values in the R chart are within the control limits. Thus, although the process mean is out of control, the process variability is in control. Other Analysis  · The random sample of defects from Exhibit 4 is tabulated below. Operator Defects Auditor Defects Excess Reagent 4 11 Excess Flash on box 2 2 Negative sheet defect 3 2 Positive sheet defect 3 3 Double feed 3 3 Frame feed failure 2 9 Damaged spring 3 3 Malformed box 1 3 Insufficient reagent 1 4 Misalignment 1 3 Marginal lamination 1 2 Dirt from assembly 0 5 After Greenlight was initiated, the number of defects reported by operators has halved from 1% to 0. % while those reported by auditors has increased from 1% to 10%. This may be due to the fact that the operators are not recording all the defective samples which they are using to adjust their mac hines. Also, since the auditors feel that asking the operators to be incharge of the quality is like handing over the henhouse to the foxes, most of them may have shifted to stringent checking of the cartridges which would explain the jump from 1% rejects to 10% rejects, which was the level of rejects which only the stringent auditors had earlier. There is some evidence for both the above points. The tweaking of the machines by the operators may explain why so many readings are out of the control limits, though the machine should have undergone maintenance and calibration as soon as the first reading was outside the control limits, which explains why the auditors are finding many more rejects due to the feed than the operators. Also, the auditors are finding more rejects due to the reagent, although the process is under control. This may be due to stringent checking. Another indication of stringent checking is that cartridges are being rejected due to their having dirt which has been attributed to assembly. RECOMMENDATIONS Control measures need to be incorporated at the injection molding machines in order to minimize defect rates, and defects need to be prioritized, to help in setting control limits and the ratings on the quality of products.  · The operators need to realize that the process downstream is the customer, and they need to shutdown the machine for maintenance a s soon as the process goes out of control rather than waiting for the machine to start producing defective pieces.  · Polaroid can carry out a market research exercise on consumers, to determine which attributes need compliance from the customer’s point of view. It will also need to establish the technical specification limits for various components. These will need to build into a 6-sigma process to increase quality by improving the processes and reduce variation in outputs.  · The people, especially the top management, need to be convinced about the effectiveness of process control, which doesn’t have any problem with the quality apart from above observations.  · Proper documentation of all the procedures and processes should be assured, in order to keep people focused on quality once defect rates drop significantly below 1%. This documentation should be accessible to all concerned people and they should be instructed unambiguously to adhere to the norms.  · Automated methods for data collection need to be adopted, like the ones mentioned in the case, since the operators have proved to be unreliable. The investment is not large enough to make a serious dent in the company’s bottom line, and should be considered.  · A better and more comprehensive training model needs to be introduced to train the workers and supervisors in basic statistics and the application to process control The high-volume driven mindset of the people needs to be changed, and an atmosphere needs to be built which engenders mutual trust between operators and auditors. Appendix Sample Statistical Process Control Measurements Pod Weight (grams) Sample Number Day Shift 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean Range 3-Aug A 2. 800 2. 799 2. 760 2. 802 2. 805 2. 803 2. 795 0. 045 B 2. 750 2. 820 2. 850 2. 740 2. 850 2. 790 2. 800 0. 110 C 2. 768 2. 807 2. 807 2. 804 2. 804 2. 803 2. 799 0. 039 4-Aug A 2. 841 2. 802 2. 802 2. 806 2. 807 2. 807 2. 811 0. 039 B 2. 801 2. 770 2. 833 2. 770 2. 840 2. 741 2. 93 0. 099 C 2. 778 2. 807 2. 804 2. 804 2. 803 2. 804 2. 800 0. 029 5-Aug A 2. 760 2. 804 2. 804 2. 806 2. 805 2. 806 2. 798 0. 046 B 2. 829 2. 804 2. 805 2. 806 2. 807 2. 807 2. 810 0. 025 C 2. 741 2. 850 2. 744 2. 766 2. 767 2. 808 2. 779 0. 109 6-Aug A 2. 814 2. 804 2. 803 2. 805 2. 807 2. 804 2. 806 0. 011 B 2. 787 2. 802 2. 805 2. 804 2. 805 2. 804 2. 801 0. 018 C 2. 766 2. 805 2. 804 2. 802 2. 804 2. 806 2. 798 0. 040 7-Aug A 2. 774 2. 801 2. 805 2. 805 2. 805 2. 804 2. 799 0. 031 B 2. 770 2. 801 2. 833 2. 770 2. 840 2. 741 2. 793 0. 099 C 2. 832 2. 836 2. 794 2. 843 2. 13 2. 743 2. 810 0. 100 10-Aug A 2. 829 2. 846 2. 760 2. 854 2. 817 2. 805 2. 819 0. 094 B 2. 850 2. 804 2. 805 2. 806 2. 807 2. 807 2. 813 0. 046 C 2. 803 2. 803 2. 773 2. 837 2. 808 2. 808 2. 805 0. 064 11-Aug A 2. 815 2. 804 2. 803 2. 804 2. 803 2. 802 2. 80 5 0. 013 B 2. 782 2. 806 2. 806 2. 804 2. 803 2. 802 2. 801 0. 024 C 2. 779 2. 807 2. 808 2. 803 2. 803 2. 803 2. 801 0. 029 12-Aug A 2. 815 2. 815 2. 803 2. 864 2. 834 2. 803 2. 822 0. 061 B 2. 846 2. 854 2. 760 2. 829 2. 817 2. 805 2. 819 0. 094 C 2. 767 2. 804 2. 834 2. 803 2. 803 2. 803 2. 802 0. 067 13-Aug A 2. 850 2. 04 2. 804 2. 804 2. 804 2. 804 2. 812 0. 046 B 2. 810 2. 820 2. 814 2. 794 2. 798 2. 787 2. 804 0. 033 C 2. 850 2. 820 2. 750 2. 740 2. 850 2. 790 2. 800 0. 110 14-Aug A 2. 750 2. 765 2. 850 2. 760 2. 790 2. 840 2. 793 0. 100 B 2. 830 2. 770 2. 848 2. 760 2. 750 2. 830 2. 798 0. 098 C 2. 740 2. 770 2. 833 2. 770 2. 840 2. 800 2. 792 0. 100 17-Aug A 2. 753 2. 807 2. 805 2. 804 2. 802 2. 804 2. 796 0. 054 B 2. 851 2. 751 2. 752 2. 773 2. 849 2. 806 2. 797 0. 100 C 2. 845 2. 804 2. 803 2. 806 2. 805 2. 806 2. 812 0. 042 18-Aug A 2. 844 2. 777 2. 754 2. 791 2. 833 2. 811 2. 802 0. 90 B 2. 806 2. 839 2. 805 2. 804 2. 850 2. 740 2. 807 0. 110 C 2. 849 2. 801 2. 804 2. 7 62 2. 814 2. 791 2. 804 0. 087 19-Aug A 2. 820 2. 793 2. 812 2. 833 2. 853 2. 812 2. 821 0. 060 B 2. 790 2. 780 2. 764 2. 843 2. 843 2. 818 2. 806 0. 079 C 2. 850 2. 806 2. 805 2. 814 2. 807 2. 807 2. 815 0. 045 20-Aug A 2. 767 2. 831 2. 808 2. 793 2. 836 2. 811 2. 808 0. 069 B 2. 833 2. 825 2. 793 2. 813 2. 823 2. 766 2. 809 0. 067 C 2. 824 2. 799 2. 790 2. 764 2. 817 2. 805 2. 800 0. 060 21-Aug A 2. 778 2. 775 2. 799 2. 805 2. 833 2. 772 2. 794 0. 061 B 2. 801 2. 832 2. 758 2. 759 2. 773 2. 14 2. 790 0. 074 C 2. 770 2. 787 2. 744 2. 766 2. 807 2. 803 2. 780 0. 063 Average 2. 8025 0. 0640 UCL for mean = 2. 8332 UCL for Range = 0. 1280 LCL for mean = 2. 7718 LCL for Range = 0. 0000 Sample Statistical Process Control Measurements Finger Height (mm) Sample Number Day Shift 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean Range 3-Aug A 1. 90 1. 95 1. 94 2. 00 2. 05 2. 16 2. 00 0. 26 B 2. 15 2. 17 2. 11 2. 13 2. 02 2. 03 2. 10 0. 15 C 1. 73 1. 90 2. 07 1. 89 1. 76 1. 88 1. 87 0. 34 4-Aug A 2. 30 2. 41 2. 54 2. 37 2. 3 2 2. 16 2. 35 0. 38 B 2. 28 2. 16 2. 19 2. 08 2. 25 2. 24 2. 20 0. 20 C 1. 92 2. 24 2. 1 1. 89 1. 88 2. 17 2. 04 0. 36 5-Aug A 2. 39 2. 28 2. 10 2. 36 2. 54 2. 25 2. 32 0. 44 B 2. 11 2. 21 2. 24 2. 21 2. 17 2. 24 2. 20 0. 13 C 1. 89 1. 90 1. 73 2. 07 1. 89 1. 76 1. 87 0. 34 6-Aug A 2. 51 2. 25 2. 08 2. 35 2. 29 2. 32 2. 30 0. 43 B 2. 22 2. 19 2. 22 2. 24 2. 01 2. 23 2. 19 0. 23 C 1. 89 1. 90 1. 78 2. 07 1. 89 1. 76 1. 88 0. 31 7-Aug A 1. 95 2. 07 2. 25 1. 95 2. 11 2. 16 2. 08 0. 30 B 2. 08 2. 03 2. 27 2. 23 2. 24 2. 13 2. 16 0. 24 C 2. 31 1. 90 1. 86 1. 91 1. 89 1. 87 1. 96 0. 45 10-Aug A 2. 23 2. 25 2. 21 1. 89 2. 15 2. 11 2. 14 0. 36 B 2. 23 2. 21 2. 05 2. 19 2. 7 2. 16 2. 15 0. 18 C 1. 73 2. 00 1. 79 1. 75 1. 84 1. 74 1. 81 0. 27 11-Aug A 2. 21 2. 11 2. 21 2. 44 2. 17 2. 30 2. 24 0. 33 B 2. 17 2. 19 2. 15 2. 04 2. 07 2. 22 2. 14 0. 18 C 2. 01 1. 90 1. 90 1. 81 2. 06 1. 89 1. 93 0. 25 12-Aug A 2. 08 2. 19 2. 28 2. 29 2. 21 2. 45 2. 25 0. 37 B 1. 93 2. 09 1. 90 1. 95 2. 04 2. 09 2. 00 0. 19 C 1. 84 2. 12 1. 90 1. 89 2. 01 1. 75 1. 92 0. 37 13-Aug A 2. 23 2. 01 2. 25 2. 11 2. 39 2. 15 2. 19 0. 38 B 2. 19 2. 22 2. 18 2. 15 2. 23 2. 04 2. 17 0. 19 C 1. 96 2. 05 2. 16 1. 87 2. 13 1. 90 2. 01 0. 29 14-Aug A 2. 27 2. 00 2. 06 1. 97 2. 13 2. 05

Why do you want to attend ASDOH Essay Example

Why do you want to attend ASDOH Essay Example Why do you want to attend ASDOH Essay Why do you want to attend ASDOH Essay Being the only school of Dentistry and Oral Health in Arizona, I would consider it a personal honor if I am allowed to attend what is the most prestigious and premier dental school in the state. I have considered applying to and attending many out of state schools but my research has shown that no other school can come close to the benefits of studying at ASDOH. I want to become a student at this school because of the way the classes and students will always be community centered. That means that I will be able to put my volunteer learned skills to work while studying. I believe that dentistry is a job that requires the dental professional to have the abilities of patience and compassion in endless quantity and that ASDOH can teach and training me to become a future community and educational leader. I am a person who believes that hands on training beats theoretical training anytime. Which is why I am sure that I shall gain the most benefits out of the exemplary learning environment of the school. I believe that I am a perfect candidate for becoming a student at this school because of my ability to learn under any given condition with a team or alone. I have what is takes to succeed in this field not only because of my strict sense of self discipline, but also because after I have graduated with an ASDOH diploma under my belt, I will also have the most important qualities of compassion, community concern, and clinical experiences that ASDOH will have molded into each of their highly trained and capable graduates.